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INTRODUCTION
Plow much does it cost to achieve readiness? Does it cost the
U. S. Navy more to train a light-jet attack squadron of A4D aircraft
at Oceana, Virginia, than it does at Miramar, California? Assuming
that the S2F squadrons in Task Group ALFA achieve the identical readi-
ness grade of those in Task Group BRAVO, which squadron does the job
the most economically? To the uninitiated - Joe Civilian, most busi-
nessmen, some Congressmen - these are simple, logical questions which
can doubtlessly be answered by a quick reference to "the record."
To the average Naval officer, these questions mean: "The man wants to
know the BRAVO Allotment cost per flight hour." To some Naval offi-
cers, the answers to these questions are summed up in a single state-
ment: "You just don't understand the problem!" And, finally, to a
few other officers these questions evoke a question in return: "Have
you noticed how far your nose is intruding into my business?' 1
It is the intent of this paper to examine the factors which
contribute to the cost of aircraft squadron readiness with a view
toward determining the feasibility of assigning these costs to an
individual squadron. In order to do this, it is first necessary to
become conversant with the term "readiness" as it is currently under-
stood by operational and administrative commanders. To assist this
effort, the reader is taken through some of the pertinent steps in

the chain of command as depicted in Figure 1. Throughout the study
existing cost records relevant to squadron operations - such as the
familiar dollars of BRAVO Allotment per flight hour mentioned above -
are described. Additional data that would be required in order to
tell a more complete story is indicated. Finally, some of the poss-
ible uses of additional cost information are outlined along with some
implications of the uses as the journey is made back up the chain of
command of Figure 1.
XNote that Figure 1 is entitled SIMPLIFIED Chain of Command. It
by no means purports to be either a complete picture or even an accurate
one for purposes other than those for which it is shown. For example,
operational command is exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations only
as he acts as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through certain
Unified Commanders.
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Readiness is by no means all things to all people. On the
other hand, it can be a very elusive thing because it means something
different to almost every person who concerns himself with it.
There are those who will make a strong cas~ for what one may
choose to call "the big picture" variety of readiness. Proponents
claim, and sometimes loudly at that, that every dollar spent and every
action taken by each person in the military establishment should have
as its goal an improvement in the status of readiness of that establish-
ment. It ii not too difficult to convince oneself that all money spent
and action taken does in fact have an effect on readiness, albeit not
and improvement. Few persons indeed would question direct inputs to
readiness such as gunnery practice, anti-submarine exercises conducted
by surface and air units, or even d~f^.nsive practices such as fire
drills and ditching practice. A contract administrator riding herd on
a defense contract somewhere in the far-flung complex of the Fureau of
Naval Weapons can doubtless relate his actions to ultimate effects on
the readiness of the Navy to do battle, even though his views might
not be shared by members of the gun crew on a Seventh Fleet destroyer
standing off the troubled shores of Southeast Asis. The officer
studying financial management or accounting may at times need to back
off and take a deep look into an uncertain future to trace the thread

5that links him to an ultimate ability to wage successful war against
any possible enemy, but trace it he can - so say the men who look af
"the big picture." There is one category of person in the Navy who is
almost invariably unimpressed by any argument advanced to convince him
that he himself is contributing to readiness, and that is the hot-
blooded, Gung-ho young semi-adult who joined the Navy so that he could
go forth and set the rest of the world on fire but somehow wound up as
a mess cook at the Navy base in his own home town.
Narrower points of view concerning readiness frequently are
centered on the Fleet. Generations of Navy men were imbued with the
undisputed adage about the nation's first line of defense. A natural
by-product is that he who is a member of "the Fleet" is contributing
to readiness, while he who is not obviously contributes only to the
weight of the millstone around the fighting man's neck. And within
the Fleet itself there is by no means unanimity of opinion. Destroyer-
men and aircraft carrier sailors of tody, just as battleship sailors
of yesterday, scarcely look upon men in ships of the train as worthy
of the name sailor, while submariners own no equal on, under, or over
the sea. Within a ship itself the controversy continues. Members of
the gun crews are under no illusions about the "black gang" - unfort-
unately engineers are needed in order to get this floating gun plat-
form from one engagement to the next. Similarly, the men who fly the
aircraft which are the main batiery of an aircraft carrier are wont to
look upon the other three thousand-odd souls on board as little better
than second class humans. Pride? Esprit-de-corps? Yes, all of that
and more. Behind it all lies the controversy over readiness - who

6contributes the most?
The foregoing discussion has centered on relative contribu-
tions to readiness - the ability to do a job. The complete recipe
for readiness, regardless of the cook, includes another important in-
gredient: timeliness. Complete ability - if such a thing exists -
to fight a war next year may well be worthless in the face of an over-
whelming attack next week. A sense of urgency is easily achieved when
faced with immediate danger or the prospects of it. Ability to do the
job now was perhaps never more tellingly underscored than by Captain
Taussig upon reporting with his destroyer squadron to Admiral Bayly,
^he commanding chief of the British forces, at Queens town within weeks
of our entry into World War I:
After acknowledging the introduction, Bayly's first words were
these: "Captain Taussig, at what time will your vessels be ready
for sea?" Taussig replied, "I shall be ready when fueled." The
admiral then asked, "Do you require any repairs?" (Meaning dock-
yard work.) Taussig answered, "No, sir." The admiral's third
and last question was, "Do you require any stores?" (Meaning dry
provisions.) Taussig answered, "No, sir! Each vessel now has on
board sufficient stores to last for seventy days." The admiral
concluded the interview with these instructions: "You will take
four days' rest. Good morning." 1
In more recent times the Cold War has a way of growing old, a
tendency to blunt the sharp edge of readiness by striking it against
the crumbling rock of repeated Soviet threats. Admiral Jerauld Wright,
formerly Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, never permitted himself or his staff to drop the
guard of readiness for a moment. His oft-repeated assessment of his
As quoted by Carroll Storrs Alden and Ralph Earle, Makers of
Naval Tradition, Boston: Ginn and Company, 1925, p 295

7own task and that of his commands was to "be ready to fight a war to-
morrow morning before breakfast. ,; One of the most colorful of present-
day naval commanders, Admiral "Cat" Brown, brought home the immediacy
of the readiness requirements of the Sixth Fleet which he then com-
manded by declaring that his problem was to keep the Fleet alive and
fighting for at least forty-eight to seventy- two hours after the com-
mencement of open hostilities.
In a formal organization filled to the brim with formal people
trained from the start to think in formal terms, surely one might ex-
pect to turn to the proper place and read the formal definition of the
terra READINESS
. Certainly it must have been reduced to specifics and
long since routinized. This all-important objective of any armed
force must be reducible to a formula, and without even the need for a
trite modification of "magic" formula. Having once penetrated the
maze of arguments surrounding the relative contributions of the vari-
ous groups, we need only turn to he written word in the manuals to
determine the exact meaning of readiness.
Readiness Defined by the Chief of Naval Operations
The words above need not be looked upon as a hauntin? mockery.
The Chief of Naval Operations has indeed subscribed to definitions of
readiness as well as yardsticks by which it shall be measured. For
example, there is the definition from a document as basic as the
Dictionary of Military Terms for Joint Usa?° : Readiness is the state
of preparedness of an individual, force, or organization for carrying
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ou : an operation, mission, task or the like. This definition, from
the vantage poin ( : of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
reads with practically no necessary modification: Readiness is a mea-
sure of the ability of the United States Navy to carry out its assigned
missions.
Turn now to the "Aircraft Accounting System," an eighty-eight
page pamphlet published as OPNAV INSTRUCTION P5442.2A by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. The purpose of this Instruction is to establish within the
Naval organization an aircraft accounting and statistical system
of such scope and timeliness as to provide the CNO, the Chief of
the Bureau of Naval Weapons, and other commands with sufficient
information to: (1) plan, direct, control, and describe the air-
craft program; (2) maintain official inventory data for the
accountability of every aircraft in Navy custody; and (3) provide
a consolidated statistical service to all activities concerned
with Navy aircraft.
2. Basically, the system is designed to provide three kinds
of data:
Who has what aircraft, and in what condition and position
in service life is the aircraft? This is inventory data,
What was done, by whom, _>.o aircraft?.This is Logistics data,
What was done, by whom, with aircraft, and how ready were
the aircraft? This is Operations and
Readiness Data.
3. The aircraft inventory, logistics, operations, and readi-
ness data are collected for management. To manage means: (a) de-
cide what is to be accomplished, (b) direct the selection, acquisi-
tion, and sustenance of the means (including funds from Congress)
for doing it, (c) command the use of che means, and (d) review
the whole business to see how i; could be done better, why things
failed to go as planned, and what was overlooked, and what was
2Dictionary of Military Terms for Joiat ^u;y , Joint Chiefs of
Staff Publication Mo. 1

9extraneous; and to learn and benefit from experience. The capabil-
ity to fight (as a deterrent to war), or the actual use (in the
conduct of war) of, armed aircraft on a combat mission is the prime
reason for naval aviation. Hence, aircraft is the prime element
of naval aviation; all others (aviation base facilities, aviation
supply, etc.) are subsidiary thereto. Since the Aircraft Account-
ing System is she prime informational base for management of the
aircraft element of naval aviation, accurate and complete aircraft
data is of critical importance.
^
The Glossary of the same instruction contains a further definition per-
tinent to the discussion of readiness in an aircraft squadron:
READY (Aircraft ). A Flyable aircraft having the necessary equip-
ment aboard to carry out the primary mission for which it was
assigned. An aircraft without necessary equipment installed will
be considered Ready if the equipment is on hand, serviceable, and
readily installable within one hour. When applied to combat air-
craft in combat units, Ready aircraft are able to perform the
scheduled combat mission; when applied to other aircraft, Ready
aircraft are capable of performing the scheduled mission or train-
ing.*
Here we see again the two basic ingredients of Readiness: ability, or
capability, and timeliness. In may be well to take note here of the
previous title of this Instruction. Prior to the publication date of
the current edition, May 1, 1960, this Instruction was titled "Aircraft
Operational Readiness and Activity Report". In the working papers
leading to the current revision of the instruction, the purpose of the
previous edition was discussed. In brief, its purpose was to provide
information on Navy Aircraft covering operational readiness, reasons
(with quanticative measures attached thereto) for non- readiness, in-
commission availability, and flight activity. Insofar as naval air-
craft are concerned, the interests of the Chief of Naval Operations
^Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,




were said to be centered in the operational readiness aspect and the
major areas of non-readiness which were itemized as maintenance, logis-
tics and ground support equipment.
Readiness at the Fleet Commander Level
Even the somewhat divergent aspects of readiness that we have
explored through the eyes of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
would not be too difficult to assimilate if this were the only facet
of the picture. Further investigations at other levels of command,
however, quickly disclose that readiness does indeed have other faces.
The next level below the Chief of Naval Operations - and the
level at which operational* command is exercised under the existing con-
cepts implemented in ihe 1958 reorganization of the Department of De-
fense - is the Unified Command. At this level, for example, is Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The Navy
components of these commands are Commander- in Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet (C1NCPACFLT) , and Commander-in-Chief, United States At-
lantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) respectively. And readiness begins to
change right here.
Strategists on the staff of C1NCPACFLT study three basic items
in fashioning the plans for defending the United States in their area
of the world: (1) the threat, (2) the geography, and (3) the forces
available - both men and weapons - to meet the threat. SJrategists on
the staff of CINCLANTFLT study the same problems related to their areas
of interest, and - small wonder - arrive at different conclusions from
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those of their counterparts around the world. Thus it is that total
readiness in the Pacific is enhanced by the employment of the P5M
Martin Marlin seaplane, while the planners in the Atlantic have seen
fit to place more emphasis on the capabilities of the P2V Lockheed
Neptune land-based patrol aircraft.
The Fleet Commander is still looking at readiness at arm's
length, however, albeit his arm is not as long as that of the Chief
of Naval Operations. It would be a grave injustice to say that
Admiral Dennison, the current Atlantic Fle<*t Commander, does not con-
cern himself with the details of readiness. It would also be an
open admission of ignorance to consider readiness at this command
level in the same terms as those which would be of consequence to a
small unit, commander. For example, a squadron commander might well
concern himself with the fact that the radar equipment in one of the
aircraft of his command is inoperative; the Fleet Commander could
well ignore this and center his attention upon an indication that
this type of radar equipment characteristically is unreliable and
unable to meet the demands put upon it by usual operating conditions
met throughout the Fleet. In this instance, each of the officers is
concerning himself with readiness commensurate with the scope of his
own responsibilities.
^This is not to say that their deliberations are limited to
these three general areas. A more detailed investigation, however, is




Readiness at the Numbered Fleet and Type Commander Level
The next step down the chain of command brings the investiga-
tion to a split path. The numbered Fleet commander (Commander Second
Fleet, Commander Sixth Fleet), and the equivalent command level Com-
mander Antisubmarine Defense Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, follows
the path of operational command. The type Commander, on the other
hand, follows the path of administrative support. Commander Naval
Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, exemplifies this administrative
commander who is also referred to as the logistics type commander.
The Commander of the Second Fleet is the operational comman-
der of the offensive force* assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Atlantic Fleet. It follows, then, that his prime concern in the
readiness area centers upon the level of training attained by the
forces assigned. This is not to say that he excludes from his con-
siderations the material strength of the forces assigned, and cer-
tainly he may not omit consideration of weaknesses of these forces.
However, his job reduces itself to making the most of what was
assigned to him. He may well state a requirement for more and better
trained personnel to operate more modern equipment, but he himself is
not the commander responsible for fulfilling these requirements. For
example, he may well note that A4D aircraft assigned to his forces
are inadequate to perform the mission of strike support, and he may
consequently state a requirement for a newer, faster, and better
equipped aircraft to replace the A4D. The tasks of procuring re-
placement aircraft and of training the personnel in the new skills
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involved, however, will not fall upon his shoulders. COMASDEFORLANT
fulfills a similar role with the defensive forces of the Atlantic
Fleet. He attempts to maximize the effectiveness of the anti-sub-
marine forces which are available to him, and at the same time will
state requirements for new equipments and skills needed to combat
the potential submarine threat.
Commander Naval Air Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVAIR-
LANT), as administrative or logistics Type Commander, performs com-
plementary functions to those enumerated above. In recent years
this commander has looked upon readiness as consisting of three major
subdivisions: Material, Personnel, and Training.
(1) Material. New aircraft are accepted from the manufac-
turer by representatives of the Bureau of Naval Weapons and are trans-
ferred to the ultimate Fleet user at the direction of COMNAVAIRLANT
,
who at this point assumes responsibility for logistic support of the
new aircraft. He coordinates the range and scope of spare support
through the aviation supply system, provides technical instructions
for the maintenance and upkeep of the aircraft, monitors the dis-
tribution and the installation of changes to the aircraft as they
become available - in short, it is his responsibility to see that
the end user has in his hands a ready aircraft.
(2) Personnel. COMNAVAIRLANT monitors the receipt and dis-
tribution of personnel from two primary sources: (a) new input from
various basic training sources such as the Naval Air Training Com-
mand for new pilots and the "Boot Camps" for new enlisted personnel,
and (b) personnel returning to the Fleet from tours of shore duty.
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Distribution control has varied from time to time, but at the present
time COMNAVAIRLANT monitors the actions of the Eureau of Naval Per-
sonnel with an eye to insuring the equitable distribution of -he vari-
ous r.alents as well as numbers of personnel to the operating units.
Under the current concept of Level Readiness, which will be further
developed in the ensuing paragraph, COMNAVAIRLANT is also very much
concerned with the number and rate of transfers out of operating units.
Excessive personnel turnover obviously could be expected to have a
detrimental effect on the continuity of effort in a given unit.
Level Readiness strives to maintain a small but steady per-
sonnel turnover rate roughly equivalent to double the number of per-
sons assigned divided by the normal length of tour expressed in months.
Thus if three hundred men are assigned for a normal our of thirty
months each, total transfers in any given month (INS plus OUTS) should
approximate two times three hundred divided by thirty, or twenty
transfers. Notice that the measure here is one of quantity only
rather than quality; however, over an extended period of time qual-
ity changes tend to even out just as quantity. Of particular signi-
ficance here, also, is the fact that READINESS begins to relate to
specific unit commands. For the first time in tracing readiness
downward through the chain of command, it can be seen that a com-
mander at this level is involved not only with the problem in its
overall aspects but also with the particular problems of concern to
the individual unit. But note, too, that in progressing down the
chain of command the perspective has narrowed so that initial pro-
curement of personnel has all but vanished from the picture, and the
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Type Commander "procures" persons who have already completed the
basic training stages.
(3) Training. In order to understand the responsibilities
of the Type Commander in the extremely important function of training,
it is necessary to have a firm grasp of the concept of level readi-
ness which was introduced in the preceding paragraph.
Prior to 1957, cyclical readiness was practiced in aircraft
squadrons. This concept provided that a "bunch" of basically trained
personnel were brought together in one command which may or may not
have held over a small nucleus from a previous deployment cycle.
Over a fairly well-defined training cycle this "bunch" was gradually
•i
molded into a closely knit fighting organization. Having attained a
certain degree of readiness, this organization was utilized in fur-
ther training periods and fleet training exercises until it finally
evolved into a first- line fighting unit. At this point (in theory,
at least) the squadron would be deployed - it would take its place
as an important cog in a much larger force such as the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterranean or the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. At the
end of this period of deployment, the squadron would return to its
home port and, for all practical purposes, disband* The length of
the cycle varied with the type of aircraft and employment of the
unit, but a representative length would be thirty to thirty-six
months. This concept provided a highly trained and effective first
team with back-up units at varying stages of preparedness. As the
number of combat units was being reduced in the mid- 1950' s, it soon
became apparent that turn-around time between deployments was shrink-
ing so drastically that it was no longer possible to train a "bunch"
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of men 'o become a fighting uni' in he time available.
Into ":he midst of this rapidly deve loping chaos was thrust
the new concept of level readiness. At the onset the only well de-
fined features of the new idea were its supporters and opponents,
each of them certain and vociferous. Suffice it to say of the oppon-
ents that they were overwhelmed by the facts of the new situtation,
principally the fact of reduced forces. Using as its base the
stabilized, evenly paced personnel turnover described in the preced-
ing section, it provided a relatively high percentage of "old-timers"
at all times. The newcomer, be he "nugget" or "boot", 6 found quali-
fied instructors who had been in the command long enough to be tho-
roughly trained not only in their own assignments but also ac super-
visors of rhe uninitiated. On the other hand, since there would
always be some newcomers in the organization under the rules of the
new system, the overall level of training could never in theory
attain the peak possible under cyclical readiness, when personnel
changes were reduced practically to zero during periods of deploy-
ment. By loosening the shackles which bound a unit to a long-term
cycle of training, 'he concept and practice of lev^l readiness per-
mitted Naval Aviation o recoup much of the fl>xibility which it
lost during the drastic reduction in force levels in 1956 and 1957.
COMNAVAIRLANT, as the logistic Type Commander, is charged
with the responsibility of providing trained units to the operational
6
" Nugget" - a Naval aviator serving his first tour in a
squadron following completion of flight training.




commanders ( COliSECONDFLT and COMASDEFORLANT ) . Acceptance of the con-
cept of level readiness made the fulfillment of this responsibility
possible providing a mutually agreeable definition of che terra
" trained" could be reached. To assist in this matter, C0MNAVA1RLANT
devotes a large portion of its Training and Readiness Manual to a
detailed exposition of numerous formalized "exercises." Reports of
completion of these "exercises" by the individual squadrons, along
with items giving effect to the material and personnel conditions ex-
tant, is converted into a numerical grade representing percentage of
readiness. Close collaboration of opposite numbers on the staffs
of the COMSECONDFLT and COMNAVAIRLANT is necessary to assure that all
important training evolutions are formalized into exercises and that
relative weights assigned the various exercises will produce a truly
representative picture of the training which a squadron has undergone.
COMNAVAIRLANT is also responsible for providing individual
training for officers and enlisted men in order to qualify chem in
the operation of various equipments and systems in operating units of
the Fleet. An example of this type of individual training is that
provided by the Fleet Airborne Electronics Training Unit, Atlantic
(FAETULANT), at Norfolk, Virginia, where pilots and enlisted aircrew-
men are taught the tactical use of electronic systems incorporated
in the aircraft of Fleet squadrons. The introduction of new equip-
ments in Fleet aircraft would obviously fail to contribute to the
'Problems introduced by variations in interpretations of these
exercises will be considered in a subsequent section of this chapter.
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betterment of readiness unless this introduction can be matched with
qualified operators. COMNAVAIRLANT, through FAETULANT, mus antici-
pate the arrival in Fleet uni's of the new equipment by such lead-
time as is necessary to permit installation of the equipment in the
school, training of instructors to the point where they are qualified
in turn to teach the use of the new equipment, and training of the
squadron personnel from those units which will be the recipients of
the equipment prior to its arrival.
In summation, the type commander is charged with the respon-
sibility of produci ing level-ready squadrons for use or employment by
the operational commanders. Readiness from "he type commander's point
of view consists of three major subdivisions: Material (including
maintenance and supply), Personnel, and Training (both unit and in-
dividual). 8
Readiness at the Squadron Level
To make the journey down the chain of command complete, it
would be necessary to consider several other commands: The Carrier
Division commanders, Wing commanders, aircraft carrier commanding
officers and Carrier Air Group commanders. The first two, however,
have essentially the same viewpoint as the numbered Fleet commander
and the type commander, while the latter two are in much the same
category as the squadron commanding officer.
Though this section has been developed through the Atlantic
Fleet organization, the same command levels with similar titles aro
present in the Pacific Fleet. These two analogous command systems





It might be natural to consider that the squadron commanding
officer, located at the nether extremities of a long chain of command,
could have no mind of his own regarding readiness or, for that matter,
any other facet of command. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The squadron commanding officer's personal interpretations of the
myriad instructions, publications, manuals, and directives engrave
his personality and character boldly across the face of his command.
If the squadron establishes an enviable record, the commanding offi-
cer is deserving of credit and higher command can congratulate it-
self upon its success in appointing the right man for the job. Con-
versely, a squadron which suffers decreases in its readiness and
effectiveness as a fighting unit must inevitably reflect unfavorably
upon the abilities of the commanding officer and give pause to those
responsible for placing him in such a position of auuhoriy. To be
sure, -here will always be factors beyond the control of the command-
ing officer which will have their effects upon the squadron readiness,
but even so his reaction to these factors will help to provide the
mark of the man.
The pilot of a high-flying aircraft over New York City on a
clear night may without too much difficulty identify mid- town Man-
hattan. At the same instant a pedestrian forcing his way through
the crowds and dodging taxis while crossing Times Square identifies
his position in relation to mid-town Manhattan also. The location
is he same; the perspective is vastly different. Commanders high
in the chain of command may well focus at ten ion on the same problem
areas besetting readiness as the commanding officer of a squadron,
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but the squadron commanding officer is much mors likely to be aware
of the "taxi drivers" endangering his immediate progress.
Readiness problems in a squadron naturally segment themselves
along departmental lines, i.e., Operations, Maintenance, and Adminis-
tration. (For he sake of con'. inuity, it is helpful to note tha .
Operations includes the training function; Maintenance also encom-
passes supply; and Administration has personnel as a component func-
tion.)
Within a combatant squadron' i 1 is usual practice to consider
the operations department as the "'line" department, while the others
perform a "service" and/or a "staff" function. To some persons,
readiness is and should be measured right in this department. The
concept is prevalent enough that the two words "operational readi-
ness" are as inseparable as Damnyankee in the deep south. Many of
the books of original entry of the readiness reporting network are
maintained within the operations department. The individual avia-
tor's flight log book has recorded in it each flight that the avia-
tor makes while attached to the command. At a glance, the commanding
officer or his representatives can determine the date, duration,
purpose, and general flight conditions of each flight made by each
pilo; . The information is summarized in the Master Flight Log for
the entire squadron. The flight training syllabus of :he squadron,
derived from the type commander's Training and Readiness Manual , is
administered by the operations officer. Records of the completion




of each step of the syllabus are maintained by individual crew member
and, where applicable, by cotaple '..<?. crews. Thus it is possible o de-
termine that Crew Number ONE has completed the instrument flight
training phase of the syllabus and is now participating in various
..ctical exercises. 1 can also be seen that Crew ONE is qualified
to land upon the aircraft carrier both day and night, bur the co-
pilot in his crew is lacking in qualifications in rocket, firing. By
means of the "weighs factors" assigned each of these entries, per-
centage of readiness of this crew is computed and displayed. Similar-
ly, result s of ground training are tabulated. All en ries and com-
pua ions made fulfill the sole purpose of measuring - for the Com-
manding Officer and for higher authority - he operational readiness
of fcn squadron.
The Commanding Officer has available o him in his Maintenance
Depar ment similar and even more detailed information on the material
readiness of his squadron. Data is recorded on he forms illustrated
in Figures 2 hrough j), which are included for the primary purpose of
disclosing the amoun and detail of information collecfed. The manual
entitled Aircraft Accoun ing System (OPNAV INSTRUCTION P5442.2A of
1 May 1960) prescribes the use of the forms and explains the reason-
ing of the system. The Worksheet of Daily Transactions Reflecting
Not-Ready Hours (Figure 2) is the fundamental document on which the
readiness reporting system is based. Aircraft in the squadron's
custody together with non-readiness data by model and side number are
developed and summarized daily on he worksheet for pos'ing to the
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OPNAV B (Figura 4). Since maintenance is the major area in non-
readiness reporting, the worksheet has been designed mainly about
this activity. The worksheet is also designed to reflect not-ready
time due to reasons of: Aircraft Maintenance Delayed for Pat
(AMDP), Operational Aircraft Not Fully Equio ad for Primary Mission
(OANFE), and Ground Support Equipment. The "Daily Record of Aircraft:
Readiness" (OPNAV B) form conaius a separate line entry for each day
of the mon h as wall as a total line which summarizes -he month's
activity. The worksheet of Daily Transactions feeds each line of the
OPNAV B; and the OPNAV B feeds the Inventory and Readiness Data por-
tion of he OPNAV Z (Figure 9). The Aircraft Flight Record and Work-
sheet (OPNAV C) (Figura 5) can be used in many special ways for local
purposes. For example, for fighter squadrons one sheet might be used
either for one day's flying by all aircraft or for one mon h's flying
activity by one r.ircraft; running totals of accumulated flight data
in the month, the squadron, *:he service tour of the aircraft; status
changes, e*c. The purpose of 'he Kon hly Aircraft Readiness and
Activi'y Report (OPNAV Z) is t* provide information on he average
number of aircraft in a squadron's custody, aircraft readiness,
reasons (with quantitative measures attached thereto) for non-readi-
ness, measures of flyability, and flight activity. An overall
schematic diagram of the Aircraft Accounting System is presented in
Figure 1_0. The data collected at the squadron level is passed up
through the Administrative Type Commander (COMNAVAIRLANT in the pre-
ceding sections of this paper) where it is consolidated and summarized
before forwarding to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. It
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SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE AIRCRAFT ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
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can readily be seen that the squadron Commanding Officer has at his
disposal all of he "building blocks" necessary for him to assess
the material readiness of his command.
Within he maintenance department of the squadron is the
material (or supply) division. All financial accounting functions
of the squadron are centered here. The major concern in this area
is the administration of the BRAVO Allotment, which is the sum of
money allotted to buy aviation fuel and lubricating oil, flight
clothing, office supplies, hand tools, electronic spare parts, and
a certain relatively small variety of aviation spare parts. By far
the largest portion is accounted for in expenditures for fuel. Daily
reports are made to the Commanding Officer on the status of this
allotment: the total amount spent to date for the current month and
the current quarter, and the balance remaining. Usually, the Com-
manding Officer also keeps himself apprised of the net amount spent
per flight hour (fuel and lube oil costs per flight hour). This in-
formation is obviously useful in assisting the Commanding Officer in
planning his operations for the remainder of the accounting period.
The only other funds allotted to the squadron are a relatively small
sum sub-allotted by the "landlord" (air station or ship) from that
command's ALFA Allotment and limited to expenditures for minor main-
tenance and repair (as paini ing) of the spaces occupied. The material
division also prepares priced requisitions for all other aviation
spare parts and direct operating expenses chargeable o the squadron;
however, there is no limitation placed on these expenditures. Detailed
reports are not required by higher authority, and the total expenditure
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from the BRAVO Allotment is the normal report. This report is usually
made monthly, but sometimes is required at weekly intervals toward
the end of the fiscal year or in times of extreme paucity of funds.
Personnel administration is handled within the administrative
department. Explicit instructions are in force regarding the account-
ing for personnel transfers and receipts. The individual personnel
record of each officer and enlisted man in the squadron is the reposi-
tory of detailed information covering such areas as disciplinary
action, basic education, training completed, dependency status, longe-
vity in a given pay grade as well as in the Navy, and numerous other
items of information normally associated with personnel administration.
In addition, collective information for the ontire command is avail-
able in the personnel division. This includes personnel allowances,
manning level by rate and pay grade, and anticipated receipts and
transfers.
Since the squadron is oriented toward operational readiness,
the Commanding Officer and his superiors are very likely to assess
the squadron's readiness primarily on the basis of results of competi-
tive exercises, the annual operational readiness inspection, and, to a
lesser degree, the annual administrative/material inspection. Fleet-
wide, '.he best squadron of its type each year is recognized by the
award of the battle efficiency pennant known as the "E",
Summary
To a certain extent, readiness is an intangible not unlike
•'esprit-de-corps." More concretely, It has been closely defined
beginning at the very highest command levels. An excursion through
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the chain of command from the Chief of Naval Operations to the squad-
ron Commanding officer has disclosed that the extremely wide varia-
tions in the interpretations of the definitions stem principally from
differences in perspective rather than differences in concept. A
wide range of measurement units is available to assist in the assess-
ment of the conditions of readiness existing in a squadron in the
three major areas of Training, Material, and Personnel.
In the language of Hitch and KcKean1 , this chapter has been
devoted to an examination of 'gains". The next will consider "costs",
l*Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of De -
fense in the Nuclear Age
.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, I960,
p 165: "The consequences of an action fall into two types - (1) those
positive gains which we like to increase, or the achievement of objec-





Enquiries into the problems of readiness will normally draw
almost one hundred percent response from the officer corps of the Navy
and the Marine Corps. Almost everyone has an opinion, and most are
willing to share that opinion at the drop of a question. Conversely,
a tried and true method of conversation squelching is to attempt to
inject dollar costs into the same discussion. The most favorable re-
ception is usually indifference.
.
. the indifference of silence. A
snort of a sneer covers the middle ground lying between disinterest
at one end of the spectrum running through disbelief to antagonism at
the other end. Antagonism is no* infrequently accompanied by loqua-
ciousness strongly seasoned by emotion. Exemplifying this attitude
is the anonymous person whose comment was that, as far as he was con-
cerned, "readiness" and "cost" should not be used together in the same
sentence as the two terms are incompatible!
Popular or no, cost data can be accumulated and set over
against the positive gain - the achievement of readiness. It shall
be the purpose of this chapter to explore certain of the cost data
which are now, or migh be, collected and related to squadron level
operations. ("Operations" is used here in the broader sense to in-
clude the actions encompassed by the Operations, Maintenance, and Ad-
ministrative Departments of a squadron.) Comment concerning the poss-




Perhaps no more certain means exists for alienating the affec-
tions of the "man with the gun" than the introduction into the picture
of "th man behind the green eyeshade" - the accountant. Nonetheless,
it appears fitting that a discussion of various methods of accumulating
and of measuring costs should be prefaced by at least a slight obeisance
in the direction of the cost accountant. A widely used text on account-
ing defines cost accounting thusly:
Cost accounting represents an accounting in detail for the unit
cost of providing a service or of producing or selling products.
Cost accounting emphasizes the determination of the cost of goods,
processes, divisions, or departments rather than the accounting for
the business as a whole.
Perhaps Nickerson approaches the subject in a manner that, while not
endearing, is more acceptable to the "operator."
In the early stages of its development, cost accounting dealt
in large part with factory costs for use in inventory valuation,
profit determination, and pricing. These are still important
aspects of cost accounting, but the field has been expanded in
areas such as cost control, budgeting, and cost determination for
a variety of managerial uses and has been broadened to include
administrative expenses and distribution costs and the cost and
control problems of non-manufacturing businesses.
Information provided by cost accounting is used for a variety
of purposes by top management and by executives and supervisors
at lower levels. This information is of course of no value unless
it is used, and used properly. Effective use involves an under-
standing, on the part of the supplier of the information, of the
purpose for which it is to be used. Effective use involves also
an understanding, on the part of the user, of the basis and poss-
ible limitations of the information supplied. The useful account-
ant therefore not only is an "expert accountant" but is well
versed in the basic operations and operating problems of his com-
pany. In turn, executives who use cost accounting information are
able to do so more effectively if they have a basic understanding
of this type of accounting.
Ralph D. Kennedy and Frederick C. Kurtz, Introductory Account -
ing
, Scranton, Pennsylvania: International Textbook Company, I960, p 4
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Although cost accounting has many ramifications, its central
theme is to provide information, largely in the area of costs,
which will be useful in controlling the operations of a business.
This is by way of permitting the accountant to "get a foot in the door,"
so to speak, in order that cost accounting typt information may be in-
troduced into the discussion. Again, possible merits of the particular
cost information introduced will be considered at a later point.
Figure 1_1 portrays some of the more obvious costs associated
with the achievement of readiness and suggests some relevant units for
measuring these costs. This by no means purports to be a complete
listing, though some consideration will be given to certain omissions
and the reasons therefore.
Bravo Allotment
The most familiar - indeed, one of the only - costs presently
associated with squadron operations is the expenditure of the Bravo
Allotment. As indicated in the preceeding chapter, the Bravo Allotment
is that amount of obligational authority toted out to the Commanding
Officer of the squadron which he may utilize for purchase of aviation
fuel and lubricating oil, flight clothing, office supplies, hand tools,
electronic spare parts, and certain aviation spare parts.
Employment schedules, prescribed by the operational commander
one or more levels in the chain of command above the squadron command-
ing officer, are distilled by the operations department to flight hours.
For example, the employment schedule for the next "at sea" period of
Tash Group ALFA may prescribe an anti-submarine problem requiring two
2Clarence B. Nickerson, Cost Account ins , York, Pensylvania, The
Maple Press Company, 1954, p 1
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aircraft on station for twelve consecutive hours. Assuming that each
aircraft will be scheduled for a four and one-half hour flight, that
one-half hour transit time in each direction must be allowed, and that
succeeding flights must relieve "on station," this twelve hour exer-
cise is translated into ft requirement for thirty- two flight hours.
This requirement is also expressed in dollars by applying the recent
historic cost of fuel and lubricating oil per flight hour. Carrying
the same example forward and assuming a cost cf $24.00 per flight hour,
this twelve hour exercise may be expressed as an anticipated cost of
$768.00. Certainly no accountant is needed for these computations.
The problem is made more tedious if four concurrent exercises of vary-
ing lengths are brought into the picture, and yet it still could not
be classed as complex. The entire employment schedule for the "at sea"
period can be cos ted out to provide the Commanding Officer with an
estimate of the fuel and lubricating oil costs which will likely be
incurred. This amount deducted from the total Bravo Allotment for the
period will provide an indication to the Commanding Officer of the
remainder which, in some aspects, resembles a controllable overhead
expense allowance. True, an electronic tube failure generates an
immediate charge against this "allowance" that can hardly be assumed
controllable if the tube is to be replaced to make the equipment
operative. To a lesser extent, the same argument may be applied to
the purchase of hand to Is for general maintenance on the aircraft.
On the other hand, flight clothing can usually be continued in use at
least to the following month - and another accounting period - while
office supplies may be spread thinner and replenished less frequently.
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This component of the Bravo Allotment is commonly spread over the
accounting period and expressed in relation to anticipated flight
hours as a gross cost per flight hour; that is, It is added to the
fuel costs.
Though the above discussion exhausts the uses to which the
Bravo Allotment statistics and data are now put, several o'.her poss-
ibilities present themselves. For example, it might well be meaning-
ful to express the expenditures in relation to the number of aircraft
supported or the number of persons attached to the squadron. Since
fuel charges may be looked upon as a direct cost of operations, and
since the "product" resulting from these operations is readiness, it
should also be worthwhile to form certain ratios and comparisons of
these costs to readiness. Figure 1_1 suggests one such comparison
might be expressed in terms of dollars per flight hour versus per-
centage of readiness achieved. Since readiness is usually computed
within the squadron for individual pilots or flight crews, the above
expression may be "divided" by pilots or flight crews, in which case
it would become:
$/f light hour %readiness
—piToT versus pilot
—
If the same pilot or crew flies the same aircraft on each flight, as
is frequently the case in a multi-engine land based squadron, the term
"pilot" in the left side of the above expression can be personalized
just as it should be in all cases for the right. The expression might
read thus for Crew Number ONE:
$38. 22/f light hour 87% readiness
Crew ONE " versus Crew ONE
In similar fashion, the Bravo charges might be related to an

41
individual aircraft (instead of to the total number of aircraft as
suggested previously). Such a relationship would pinpoint the "gas
hog" aircraft and the "hangar queens" - the aircraft which harass the
maintenance crews by repeated mechanical deficiencies. It is true
that major offenders are usually well known, but trends and minor dis-
crepancies may go unnoticed for some time especially with around-the-
clock maintenance crews and flight operations.
Alfa Allotment
As the Alfa Allotment is chargeable for facility maintenance and
minor repairs and is not directly associable with flight operations,
striking of a comparative figure such as dollars per flight hour would
probably prove meaningless at the squadron level. However, flight
hours of all aircraft at a given base as well as total numbers of air-
craft tenanted at a base provide a pretty fair indication of the tempo
of operations of the overa] 1 facility. For this reason, a presentation
of dollars expended from the landlord's Alfa Allotment per aircraft may
be of considerable value to the landlord. Perhaps a more valid measure-
ment here would be in terms of dollars per square foot of area main-
tained. Such a unit would be more relevant to the condition of the
buildings on which the money is spent, while the condition of the
buildings is often independent of the operations of the units housed
therein.
Other Costs of Readiness
No other costs are charged directly to the individual squadron
at the present time; That is, the Commanding Officer is not accountable
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to higher authority for a specific sum allotted to the command as in
the case of the ALFA and BRAVO Allotments. To be sura, -here are reg-
ulations, directives, instructions, and correspondence exhorting the
Commanding Officer to exert all reasonable control over expenditures,
but "reasonable control' is not defined in dollars.
APA Spares . - Sufficient accounting information is presently included
on requisitions for aviation spare parts procured under the Appropria-
tions Purchases Account (APA Spares) o permit central supply activities
o collect usage data needed to determine scope and range of spare
part support by type of aircraft. These requisitions are priced, so
cost data is also available to central supply ac'-ivi ies. This infor-
mation, however, is not currently disseminated to squadrons, nor are
he squadrons required to use, collect, or report data on APA spares in
any form other than the individual requisi ions. Here again this cost
could be set against flight hours to provide the commanding officer
with information pertinen' o the cost of readiness. A very simple
tabulation of APA costs by individual aircraft, identified by Bureau
Number (the serial number of the aircraft) would show at a glance the
comparative dollar value of spare parts support going to each aircraft
assigned to the squadron. It is worth noting at this point that man-
hours of maintenance expended on each aircrsft is recorded under the
provisions of the aircraft accounting system (OPNAV Ins:ruction F5442.2A)'
Salaries . - This poin' s toward the next large area where costs are not
now considered at, the squadron level: Manpower. Within recent years
3 See Fieure 2
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few squadron Commanding Officers have been blessed with what they deem
a sufficient number of men to carry out satisfactorily the mission
assigned them. Two wars and widely varying personnel policies have
wreaked havoc with the distribution of personnel by rank, rate, and
rating in the overall structure, and this has inevitably carried over
into every command. Numerous control devices have been instituted,
most of them incorporating some "share -the -weal thM features. This
can perhaps best be seen by examining the workings of the Enlisted
Personnel Distribution Office, Atlantic, whose title is usually short-
ened - for obvious reasons - to EPDOLANT. This office is the central
distribution control point for all enlisted personnel assigned to all
units of the Atlantic Fleet. Assume that there are billets established
for 1,200 Aviation Boatswain's Mates throughout the Navy with a rate
distribution as follows:
Billet On Board
Pay Grade Rate Number Count
E-7 Chief Petty Officer 200 300
E-6 Petty Officer First Class 300 400
E-5 Petty Officer Second Class 300 200
E-4 Petty Officer Third Class 400 100
EPDOLANT would, in this simplified example, distribute Aviation Boat-
swain's Mates to its activities at the rate of 150% of allowance of
Chiefs, 133% First Class, 66% Second Class, and 25% Third Class. Though
there is a differentiation made between the percentages assigned to
shore activities e.s compared with fleet activities, it is interesting
to note that, under the Level Readiness concept, no one fleet activity
is assumed to be any more deserving of i ' consideration than any
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other fleet activity. The above distribution plan carries several
titles depending upon the speaker and the level at which the compu-
tations are made and applied, but suffice it to call it Manning Level
here. Many commanding officers are only vaguely aware of the manning
level idea and the control that it exerts over the number of enlisted
personnel assigned to their commands. This lack of understanding or
awareness exhibits itself in unfounded complaints of favoritism and
in fruitless requests to "bring me up to allowance." It might seem
strange to business men, who assertedly are interested in reducing
payroll costs to the smallest figure practicable for a given volume
of business, to hear the commanding officer plead for more men. If
so, it would probably be nothing less than startling for the same busi-
ness men to learn that probably not a single squadron Commanding Offi-
cer in the entire fleet knows what: his payroll costs were for the most
recent two weeks pay period. On the other hand, almost all commanding
officers are acutely aware of not only total numbers of men assigned
to their command but also of shortages by rate and rating. This same
disinterest In payroll costs in dollars and acute interest in per-
sonnel shortages is prevalent right up through all levels of opera-
tional command in the navy. To be sure, payroll costs are considered
and calculated in various offices in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and in the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Supplies and
Accounts where they enter into budget calculations, but rarely are pay-
roll costs even there related to a particular squadron or any other
similar unit command.
If payroll cos s were introduced for the consideration of the




from ihe variables associated with differences in allowances, lon-
gevity, hazardous duty pay and the like. One possible approach to these
problems is the use of the cost accountant's practice of standard costs.
This might be accomplished by applying the NaVy Basic Standard Mili-
tary Compensation Rate Table to he Personnel Allowance of the squad-
ron and then applying the overall manning level percentage to the re-
sultant. The end result would be a "standard payroll" for the period
under consideration. Variances from this standard would indicate to
the commanding officer several possibilities: (1) variations of his
command from the manning level, giving him, perhaps, good grounds for
requesting additional men; (2) departure from the average longevity,
which in turn might presage a significant lack - or abundance - of
experience available to him; and, possibly related to this, (3) an
explanation of changes in personnel and training readiness.
Whatever the approach, notwithstanding the problems encountered,
salaries of military personnel undeniably constitute a significant
portion of the total cost of producing squadron readiness.
Ground Training . - Apart from and supplementary to he unending train-
ing program that is adrainis ered within a squadron are the numerous
training schools available to officers and men through the Navy. Under
existing practices, the commanding officer is guided by several criteria
^Navy Comptroller Manual, Vol. 3, Appropriation, Cost and Pro-
perty Accounting (Field ). NAVEXOS P-1000, pp 96-97. Weighted averages
were obtained for this table by using basic pay and allowances and the
best available data as to numbers of personnel in each pay grade including
longevity. The elements of pay and allowances included in addition to
longevity are quarters, subsistence, maintenance clothing allowance for








in determining how many persons to send to which schools. First, there
are mandatory quotas assigned by higher command to certain schools such
as the School of Naval Justice; Atomic, Biological, and Chemical De-
fense School; and certain weapons delivery training. Then there are
request quotas for training in tactics, such as the Ant i- Submarine
Warfare Tactical School in Norfolk, Virginia; and in equipment opera-
tion, such as the Fleet Airborne Electronics Training Unit, also in
Norfolk. Completion of courses of instruction a' these types of
schools not infrequently is directly translated into increased readi-
ness. Thirdly, 'here are quotas available to schools providing courses
of instruction that may be classed as unquestionably useful but not:
necessary when viewed from the standpoint of increased readiness. Ex-
amples include driver training, stenomask operation, and motion picture
projector operator ^raining (though the latter is required in minimum
numbers )
.
Conspicuously absent from the list of criteria guiding the
commanding officer is any reference to the dollar cost of training.
He most assuredly considers the time los to the squadron by the
absence of the men undergoing training; and he may be made aware of
the cost of transporting the student from his command to the school and
return, but this awareness - if it exists at all - probably stems from
the difficul'y in getting travel authorization. However, insofar as
the direct costs of training in such terms as dollars per student are
concerned, the squadron commanding officer is not involved nor held in
any way accountable, as by allotment, for costs incurred.
Incidental to his discussion, it may prove interesting to note
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that very li tie more has been done about collecting costs of training
at the various schools mentioned than has been done about measuring
and collecting he costs of readiness in an aircraft squadron.
Purposely excluded from this discussion have been the costs of
education - as distinguished from training, and the costs of compara-
tively long term raining such as would interrupt (by permanent trans-
fer) a tour of duty in a given squadron. Cos ..s of chis nature, even
if they could be accurately measured, would no. be equitably allocable
to a single squadron inasmuch as the benefits derived from this ^ype
of education or training should be "depreciated" over the entire span
of a man's career.
Utilities . - Here is an area where many well-in entioned directives
fall by the wayside in the onrush of everyday living. At first glimpse
one might wonder why a squadron is no^ billed directly for he utilities
i uses. After all, light, gas, and water meters are installed on every
home, and consumers are simply billed for the amount used. Why no do
the same on every hangar? It would appear axiomatic that a commanding
officer would be more mindful of controlling waste if each month there
crossed his desk a bill for u^ili ies. In some cases this would un-
doubtedly work. There are a few squadrons that occupy a hangar or -
more likely - half of a hangar for raon hs and even years. Such
squadrons, however, muse certainly be classed as an insignificant
part of he whole. Hos squadrons ei her spend a considerable portion
of i heir time operating from ships or deployed co overseas bases. It
is noi ai all unusual for a squadron to be billeted at an entirely dif-
ferent hangar upon is return from aboard ship or overseas; in fact,
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It might not even return to he same base. Further, squadrons come
In a varie y of sizes just as do the hangars. One squadron occupying
half a hangar might well be displaced by two squadrons which must
share the same total space. Whatever else might accrue to a decision
to meter u ili'ies o squadrons, it would keep a large crew employed
in installing me:ers. Alternative methods might well be explored, how-
ever. Investigation might disclose a valid statistical means of
assigning utili ies costs such as on the basis of square feet or cubic
feet of area occupied, number of men assigned, or even number of elec-
trical ou. le s or wash bowls, showers, and toilets.
Lest his area of cost control seem entirely I oo radical, it
is proper o note that even superficial questioning of Public Works
Department personnel from several air stations elicited several pro-
posals, all claimed feasible. One, for example, had devised a plan
for billing the operations department of the air station for all utili-
ties consumed in the physical area occupied by all squadrons on the
sta ion. (A supporting contention here was that such a physical area
is both fairly well-defined and of reasonably constant size.) The
station operations department would hen in turn bill squadron users.
Whatever the statisf leal norm chosen, since the total bill and the
to al area, cube, or number of people involved would be contained in
more meaningful parameters, the resultant charge o he individual
squadron would be more defensibe.
Two other "use charges" have been included in the Utilities
area of Figure JUL, though they are not usually thought of in the same
manner as gas, lights, and water. The first of these is the airdrome.
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(see also Flight Safety below.) In a very real sense the costs of
maintaining runways, taxiways, and parking ramps; field lighting; and
control ower operations are expenses directly contributing to squadron
readiness. Any con ention from the scoffers that a given air station
would continue o operate regardless of the presence or absence of a
single squadron should be considered from the other viewpoint as well:
the squadron could and would continue to operate from some air station
in he absence of The given station. This in no wise simplifies the
problem of costing the maintenance <" the end user, however. One of
the few apparent means of prorating the cost on an equitable basis is
to base the charge on the number of take-offs and landings each squad-
ron contributes to he total for the field for the accounting period.
This da a is no now collected, and, on other than a statistical basis,
would doubtless require the employment of additional personnel in the
control ower. The other "U6e charge" is attributable to the operat-
ing expense of the various pieces of rolling stock assigned to a
squadron - trucks, rowraotors, bomb trailers, auxiliary power units,
etc. Fuel and maintenance costs of operating these vehicles is not
now bu readily could be charged to the ALFA Allotment or sub-allot-
ment of he end user rather than 'o the ALFA Alio raent of the support-
ing air sta ion. Such a procedure would associate the cost more closely
with the readiness to which it contributes.
Flight Safety . - The Naval Aviation Safety Center in Norfolk, Virginia,
has produced literally thousands of pronouncements stressing flight
safety as a fundamental precept of a pilot's way of thinking, acting,
reacting - in short, a way of life. This does not by any means exclude
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the safety center's consideration of the dollar costs of flight safety
or the lack of It* "'he basic instruct! i :rning the reporting of
aircraft accidents (OPNAV Instruction 3750.6 series) contains detailed
procedures for computing the approximate do' lar c >f accidents and
for reporting them as part of the overall report. Weekly suraraarie
aircraft accidents are published by the Safety Center, and prominently
displayed in these summaries Is the estimated total cost of all air-
craft accidents throughout the Navy for 'he period covered. No means
of allotting sums of money to cover the costs of aircraft accidents
presents icself, if for no other reason than this would carry a
connotation of appr-ving accidents up to an allotted amount.
There are other contributory costs of flight safety, however,
that should be considered, principal among Lhera being the cost of
operating and maintaining the crash crews required at each field from
which fligh' operations are conducted. This expense li ao F unlike
the use charge for the airdrome discussed earlier. Direct m.'. eri-.ils
used in
. firef ighting or rescue operations §t n - of any on'
accident could be ousted to the activity having custody of the air-
craft involved. On the other hand, all users of the field have po-
tential protection provided at all times. Charges could be made to
the squadrons on t lie basis of either total take-offs and landings, or,
since ground operations are also involved, on numbers of aircraft as-
signed during the accounting period.
The thoughtful reader will quickly realize that the items dis-
cussed up to this point, by no means exhausts the possibilities of
costing readiness. The brief section devoted to flight safety, for
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insanee, hints that ini ial procurement and replacement costs of the
aircraft hemselves should be considered. Similarly, initial costs
of the installation (hangars, shops, barracks, runways, etc.) have
not been considered. Both of these major costs are analogous to
capital expenditures of a private business or industry, just as is
the installation at a naval shipyard or printing plane. Since the
United States Congress has seen f i : to deny the military services
whatever benefits might be derived from "ownership" of capital assets
in operating industrial activities (a3 those operating under the Navy
industrial Fund concep; ), no effort is made herein to justify such
"ownership" of capital assets as aircraft and air stations.
Another cost arises in connection with pay and allowances.
Married officers receive an allowance for rental. It is graduated to
increase with increase in rank. Enlisted men receive not only a grad-
uated rental allowance but also additional amounts based upon the
number of dependents. It was suggested that statistical sampling
would be an approach to solving this variation in pay costs to the in-
dividual squadron. Even so, no e with care that a variation of forty
persons from the "average" referred to in he foocno^e under Salaries ,
would probably have an aggregate effect of a least $5,000 per month.
An even greater variant, however, enters the problem when one con-
siders medical care not only of the service member but most especially
of his dependents. It would seem that even assuming that a workable
*But see Navy Compi roller Manual
.
Vol. 3, Chap. 6, Sec. IV




method could be devised to allocate medical care costs of dependents
to a squadron nothing profitable in terms of measuring the costs of
readiness would be gained by the exercise.
Summary
This chapter has considered some of the costs o£ achieving
readiness in an aircraft squadron. Some of these cost! are now- measured,
as is the case with the ALFA and 1'iRAVO Allotments. Additional means of
measuring those costs and relating them to readine.s;* have been noted
along with some of the areas that are not now cos ted to the ultimo
user, ihe squadron. Finally, several other areas have been mentioned
and classed as "out of bounds" either by reason of political decision




PROBLEMS AND USES OF COSTS OF READINESS
The operating forces of the Navy are filled with men-in-a
hurry who might; well ask at this point: "So what? There Is readiness,
and there are costs. But I don't know how much readiness is needed, and
I don't know how much It should cost. Do you?" Of course this attitude
Is not unlike hat of the man who refused to go to church because he
recognized so many sinners in the congregation. Hitch and McKean must
have encountered this sort of opposition, for in discussing the problem
of determining he size of the defense budget they make this statement:
In brief, deciding upon rhe defense budget is a tremendous task
that must be performed under difficult circumstances. We cannot ex-
pect to Identify or achieve "optimal" solutions: we should have no
Illusions on this score. Nonetheless, looking at the problem in the
right way can aid us in reaching better solutions. 1
Later, in directing attention to the selection of the scale of defense
program
:
...we can devise exhibits and analyses that facilitate weighing
the gains and costs of alternative program- sizes. In deciding how
much (if any) penicillin to buy, a man with pneumonia does no: know
precisely how much he values good health, how to assess the risks, or
precisely what the side effects will be; but it helps a lot o know
how much penciliin coots and what effect it has on pneumonia.
Many of the cost of squadron readiness can be measured. The. fact that
all costs cannot be measured In no way invalidates those which can. Now





it is an entirely separate issue to decide how many, if any, of the costs
discussed in the previous chapter should be measured at the squadron level
and how many, if any, should be measured at other levels and applied
against the readiness of a given squadron.
It would be naive indeed to assume for a moment that this study
is unique in investigating the possibility of relating costs to readi-
ness. The idea is not so novel that it has failed to occur to others.
It follows (hat some reasons have been developed that have been deemed
sufficient to overcome arguments that have been advanced before. The
next step should be to familiarize oneself with such reasons.
The Navy Comptroller Manual is a logical place to start because
it is here that one finds operations viewed from the standpoint of the
accountant, bu with a strong counterbalancing force: of accounting
viewed from the standpoint of the operator. The opening paragraphs of
Volume 3 of the manual point out that " for accounting purposes , i is
convenient to divide 'Navy and Marine Corps activities' into shore
activities and operating activities."-* (Underscoring mine.) This di-
vision is arbitrary in some cases, and the reader is warned that it
should be applied only in connection with the accounting instructions
contained in Volumes 2 and 3* Specifically, "this division must not be
interpreted as having any implication with respect to command respons-
ibilities, administration, or any function other than determinations
related to accounting instruction . Succeeding paragraphs point to
3Volume 3, paragraph 031000 "Basic Classification."
^IBID.
,
paragraph 031001, "Scope of Classification.
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some of ""he bases for classification of an activity as part of the
operating forces, to wit, generally the organization must be of such
type that it would be actively engaged in a war or other engagement,
and normally a certain condition of mobility is expected. Almost with-
out exception, operating forces employ no civilian personnel. The
description could hardly fit better if it had been written especially
for an aircraft squadron.
Proceeding further to accounting responsibility for units of
the operating forces, the manual has rhis to say:
Since almost: all of the activities classified as operating
fercei require no civilian payroll, it is possible o devise con-
trols over charges that do not demand the assignment of a closely
related accountable activity. The official accounting for supplies
and equipage allotments of the active fleet, including Naval Re-
serve training ships assigned to the active fleet, has been assigned
to the Navy Regional Accounts Offices, Norfolk and Oakland, pri-
marily for He reduction of accounting effort afloat.
Except fcr clo'hing and small stores, ship's store material,
and transfers to ships performing Navy Stock Account (class 207)
accounting, all issues of materials to operating forces are expanded
from the stores account by the issuing activity. Therefore, the
major accounting consideration for the operating forces is the con-
trol of allotment or operating target fund charges.
^
The ideas expressed in the first two sentences excerpted above are
trange bed-fallows. An "accountable activity*' is described as an
activity hat (13 has a fiscal office as an organizational componen
and (2) is designated to perform accounting. The plain implication
here seems to be that civilian payrolls constitute a basic reason for
accounting to the extent that without such a payroll .here is no need
for accounting. The second sentence states a very plausible reason
^IBID., paragraph 031200 'Accounting Responsibility,' and
paragraph 031201 '"Accounting Function .
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for assigning 4 ted Navy Regiona'' Accounts Offices M the account-
able activities for fleet unit.3; that is, "primarily for the reduction
of accounting effort afloat. Itfcftff portion of the excerpt confirms
the earlier statements in Cha. that financial accounting respons-
ibility at the squadron level is limited to accounting for th* ALFA and
BRAVO Allotments, 6
All other arguments against accounting' in the operating forces
pale in the shadow of Cha idea pvevalj.t in the preceding quotations:
keep the operating forces problems to a minimum - streamlined 1 ' is a
term frequently applied - and let them worry only about being ready to
Lftt he ftlmra activities worry about tl . Fti r are good
reasons why fefei successful, no>. the least signifi-
cant of which I fact, that there is fairly frcqus tmt of
military person. <m tha iting forces tivities
and back again. V a potentially serious shortcoming in this
reasoning, however, stemming from the very bedrock of philosophy of
our government ; that Is, coraple:.;* civilian control over tW miliary.
Stated in another way, the man who holds the purse does not wield the
sword. Granted, :». may soea far removed from tha cost of squadron
readiness; but let the military man step forward who can ftfeata wl'h
assurance thecost of adding a third at. ack carrier to felts two already
maintained on station at all times in the Sixth fltct in the Mediterranean*
Or Nfcftt trade-off, if ay, is necessary in reducing flight operations
to compensate for the incr >-aris submarine fore uch pro-
blems could be Ml readily mastered, by either civilian or military man,
°Bu; & >ntlon Is invi ed to the "Aircraft Accounting System,"
discussed in Chapter '. accounting effort ftfUMfe" is more extens
I




if component coses were known. Lacking these costs, the planners must
enroll in the difficult, aid of:, times expensive, school el experience
and major in the study of trial -and- error.
Before the operator, the member of the operating forces, will
readily accept additional accounting responsibilities, he will likely
require satisfactory answers to two questions: I ill it cost me?
What will I get out of I' ? Of course, he will probably be thinking of
the cost and the return no ; in terms of dollars but in terras of men
and equipmen . 'ut, whatever th« terms, if ; he questions are asked,
the battle is half won. Those are the selfsame questions that any
accounting procedures should be attempting to answer for thi operator.
The operator's often expressed fear of and distaste for the possibility
of being "taken over by the accountants" has largely blinded him to the
possibilities of using the information available ro him through accoun -
ing procedures. Ke is wont to look upon comp'icated accounting systems,
such as that established under the Naval Industrial Fund, and general-
ize that all accounting systems must be complex. Double entry book-
keeping injected in'o he operating forces is very likely .o be greeted
with the charge of accounting for the sake of accounting. The obvious
poin< to stress in winning suppor for tlte adoption of any accounting
procedures in a squadron, then, should be simplicity. How well do he
various possibilities of measuring costs discussed in the previous
chapter measure up to this criterion of simplicity?
Consideration of Figures 2 and 5 indicate that all of the mea-
surements discussed incident to the BRAVO Allotment and APA Spares, ex-
cept one, might well be incorporated in "Worksheet of Daily
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transactions Reflecting Not-Ready Hours'' or OPNAV C, "Aircraft Flight
Data Worksheet". The forms would still be completed entirely within
the Maintenance Department of the squadron, as the material division
is a part of that dep -rtment. It is estimated that thj entire effort
would require no mor I han one -ha If of one man-hour per day to record.
Ths one exception men above is the tabulation of d -liars per
flight hour per pilot (crew) versus percent readiness per pilot (crew),
her the OPNAV C or "document of original entry", the "Naval Aircraft
Flight Record" (OPNAV 3760-2) commonly called "yellow sheet) could
readily be used to record the fuel and oil used per aircraft per flight
and that figure extended to read in dollars and cants. This would than
be combined with the NSA and AFA Spa sts collected as suggested
above. The net and gross costs per hour would be prepared In the
Maintenance De par tin n f r forwarding to the operations department where
it would be collated with the readiness pare* tages and displayed on the
status beards that are common to all operations departments. Entries
to .his figure would probably no,; be required any more frequently than
once a week, and possibly once a mon'h would suffice to keep the in-
formation current. It is estimated that this entire procedure would be
an insignificant addition to the work normally performed in both the
Operations and Maintenance Departmen' .
Turning next to a consideration of the salaries, or pay and
allowances, area, any cost data derived from salaries wouid be provided
to the administrative departmen'. of a squadron by the supporting Navy
Accounts Disbursing Office and would na'urally follow he semi-monthly
payday schedule. Within th« administrative department "he personnc'
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division maintains personnel allowance records that change with re-
lative infrequency. To tits allowance lists the personne division would
apply the current manning level percentages (available from 'he fleet
enlisted personnel distribution office, though no? now published) to
arrive at the so-called "standard payroll,'' and then the actual pay-
roll would be posted against the standard. While this need not be a
time-consuming procedure, the already thinly spread administrative de-
partment would probably look favorably upon an alternative procedure,
especially since disbursing storekeepers (the payroll clerks of the
Navy) are collected from fleet squadrons in order that their combined
pf forts may be utilized by the Navy Accounts Disbursing Office. The
alternative would entail furnishing of manning levo? information direct
from he enlisted personnel distribution office to the disbursing of-
fice where a direct run-off of the comparative report could be made
concurrently with the preparation of the payroll. Since machine account-
ing facilities or* utilised in both of hese facilities, additional
workload here would be negligible, and would certainly be of no conse-
quence to the squadron commanding officer.
The squadron participation in ALFA Allotment accounting is at
most a very minor consideration. The most that would be required of a
squadron to implement any of the proposals of Chap ir concerning the
ALFA Allotment would be a periodic report to the supporting air station
listing the average on-board count of aircraft or of men. In a similar
manner, the costing of utilities to a squadron would be a problem for
the reporting station. The effectiveness of such costing on the reduc-
tion of expenditures would depend largely upon the emphasis placed upon
In i he previous chapter of this paper.

it by the commanding officer through the usual military chain of com-
mand.
Administration of accounting procedures for ground training
coats would fall the lot of the training section of the operations de-
partment. No elabora e accounting procedure is envisioned; a priced
school catalog would assist the training officer in shopping around
a
for the training to be "bought,"" and a simple bank checking account,
type balance sheet would suffice for recording expenditures and bal-
ance available.
In the realm of flight safety, present procedures for record-
ing and publishing accidents costs seem sufficient. It is difficult
'o envisage paying for use of materials directly expended in fire-
fighting. This would be the equivalent of presenting a man wih a
bill for putting out a fire in his home. In other words, unless and
until a taxation system is adopted for intra-servicc financing - a
concept certainly no advocated here - such costing to the direct or
ultimate consumer is not recommended.
No cost would accrue to a squadron in accounting for utilities
costs or "use charges' , ; hough it is reasonable o assume that the
benefit of increased cost-consciousness could be derived from closer
command supervision over these costs if periodic st /'cements (rath
than bills) were rendered.
So much for costs to the squadron. It remains only to note in
passing that not one cent went for purchase of a green eyeshade for
even one accountant. What now abou: the return on the investment?
RAnd present the school administrators with problems they are
not prepared to answer.
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The first prerequisite would sees to be a differentiation be-
tween two terms used together so frequently that the meanings are
liable to intermingling. The terms are "Command 1 ' and 'Control." Lest
this become the starting point for a new * and much longer - study, it
is best to adhere fairly closely to dictionary definitions in order to
make a distinction between the two words. Command is the authority
exercised by an individual over others through his rank or ability;
control is a standard of comparison against which to check results.
To control is to exercise directing, guiding, or restraining power.
In a sense, then, command is pure, raw authority; control introduces
the idea of efficiency in the execution of 'hat authority. It is but
a single step to equ-te control with manage: to control or direct the
movements or workings. Nickerson, in his introductory chapter to Cost
Accounting , decides that "effort control is perhaps simply another way
of saying 'management'.' 1 ' So? So the return on the investment to a
squadron commanding officer is seen not in increased command but rather
in improved control
,; not in more authority, but in more efficient and
effective use of authority.
The application of these distinctions to one of the previously
proposed cost measurements may serve to illustrate the potential value
to a squadron commanding officer* Assume the; the average percentage
of erew readiness in the squadron stands at 80 percent. Further assume
that the commanding officer commands crew readiness to be improved to
95 percent, (This does not even approach being as far-fetched as the
legendary command, "There will be no more accidents. M ) While this
-Nickerson, op. cit., p 13
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command Is In the process of being carried out, the commanding officer
flies with several of the crews in turn. He makes the following tabu-
lation of his own assessment of the capabilities of the crews and lists
certain cost comparisons, or controls, which he deems pertinent:





thi.s month $/flifiht hour
1 30 $49.50
2 Excellent 90 23 48.00
3 Good 85 26 48.25
4 Fair 82 20 50.00
The conclusions to be drawn are as many and as varied as there are com-
manding officers. This commanding officer, however, concludes:
(a) Crew 2 is the best crew.
(b) Crew I is now doing a good job, but a couple of factors in-
dicate their eagerness is not paying off as well as it should. First,
the crew leader is a bit more interested in his grade than he is in
training his crew (His 92 is actually not worth as much as Crew 2's 90),
Second, even though Crew 1 is getting more time in the air, the pilots
have not learned to operate the engines at the most efficient power
settings. (This is dependent: on the crews performing similar types of
training exercises and discounts the mechanical differences between the
aircraft,
(c) Crew 3 had better get moving, chough its power setting pro-
cedures are in keeping with the best.
(d) Crew 4 needs help. The members of Crew 2 will be assigned
as instructors and as members of the standardization board.
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The difference between this evaluation and the present method can be
seen by comparing it with the following excerpt from a recent edition
of the Navy Times n wspaper:
Two crews of Patrol Squadron 23 at the Naval Air Station here
have received a "well done" from their skipper for scoring a per-
fect 100 percent in competitive exercises so far this year.
The crews are No. 6 and 13. Congratulating them was Comdr. W.
V. Collins, skipper of the unit.
These competitive exercises are tests given to a combat air
crew in all phases of Ant1-Submarine Warfare. The exercises are
graded on many different aspects besides the accuracy of the final
delivery. Planning, methods employed, procedures and crew coordi-
nation are only a few of the areas where a slight mistake can mean
loss of points, and the much desired perfect score. •*
Without a single intention of detracting from the accomplishments re-
ported above, it is noted that not a single word is included about
operating economy. It is perhaps superfluous to add that fuel economy
is directly translatable into either increased endurance or increased
range or both, and this in turn may spell the difference between a kill
and a lost contact or between successful return to base and disaster.
A firmer, surer hand on the reins of control is not a benflt
limited to the squadron commanding officer alone in the application of
cost measurements. The type commander stands to gain as well. In the
raining area, the type commander could use cost data to measure di-
rectly the relative operating efficiency of all squadrons under his
command, whether it be operational or administrative command. Proceed-
ing only in the fairly well explored paths of BRAVO charges, the type
commander need not rely on "seaman's eye" estimates of the economics
practiced by various squadrons. At present the squadrons report both
1 Navy Times . April 22, 1961, p 14
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BRAVO status and flight hours, but. he fuel costs are not broken out of
the total. Further, the BRAVO status is reviewed and controlled by the
supply department of the staff, while flight hours are monitored by the
training division in the readiness departmen and do no' constitute a
strict control factor in comparing the readiness of squadrons flying
the same type of aircraft. To be sure, actual recent gross costs per
flight hour are considered in arriving at the operating arget (OFTAR)
granted each squadron monthly from the BRAVO funds, but § rict account-
ing for the hours actually flown during the accounting period against
the amount budgeted is not generally practiced.
Insofar as NSA and APA spare parts are concerned, the type com-
mander controls the initial s-'ocking by ships and stations of allowance
lists based on usage data. Replenishment of allowance lists are of
concern to he type commander only in those ins ranees where aircraft
flight operations are restricted or hindered by the lack of needed
parts. This is a form of "management by exception" sometimes referred
to as "the squeaking wheel gets he grease." If the type commander
were to receive information on dollar value and number of line i era
issues of these two classes of materials (APA and NSA Spares) it appears
that he would h«ve a better basis for comparison of the relative opera-
ting efficiencies of the supply departments of the ships. la addition,
he cost of operating various types of aircraft could be correlated with
the several classes of aircraft carriers in the fleet. For example, a
disparl y existed for a period of several years between the practice of
two fleets - Atlan ic and Pacific - in opera ing the A3D aircraft. The




backed by the Fleet commander, not to employ the A3D aircraft on cer-
tain of the older and smaller attack carriers. Therefore, this fleet
used the A3D only on the larger Midway- and Forrestal-class ships.
The Pacific Fleet, however, utilized the aircraft on both its small and
large carriers. Close attention to the dollar value, number of issues,
and range of issues of spare parts to support the aireraft on the two
different types of carriers should disclose the existence of any differ-
ences in the capabilities of the ships to support the A3D. As it was,
either one command deprived itself needlessly or the other command took
a calculated risk which was not calculated on the basis of complete
information. In either event, cost data could have improved the valid-
ity of the military decision.
In 1959 and 1960 the Navy implemented a decision to disestablish
a type of squadron known as the Fleet Air Service Squadron (FASRON).
There was widespread discussion and controversy over the merits of con-
tinuing such squadrons as compared with transferring many of the func-
tions of the squadrons to the supporting air stations. It is interest-
ing to note, however, that neither opponent nor proponent of the FASRON
could advance a defensible argument based on costs. The clinching
argument used was not reduction in cost but realignment of functions,
it being said that many of the functions of the FASRON were properly
the responsibility of the shore activity. There is no question that
such an argument might be valid without reference to cost} however, an-
other interesting realignment of command was taking place simultaneously.
The area air commanders (titled Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Point;
Commander Fleet Air, Norfolk; and Commander Fleet Air, Jacksonville, on
4 »<
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the East Coast) were donning another hat In the shore activity chain
of command, and thereafter were known also as Commander Naval Air Bases
(COKTJAB) of the Naval Districts in which they were located. The success-
ful argument in this instance was that the new ammand relationship would
make the shore activities more responsibe to fleet requirements. Now
one of the more important readiness related functions of the old FASRON
was to provide transportation of men and materials from the shore to
aircraft carriers at sea - a function which goes by the call-name of
COD, meaning Carrier On board Delivery. With the disestablishment of
the FASRON, COD was transferred to the local air stations. The double
realignment of functions permitted fleet control of this function to
continue through the COMNAB "hat" of the COMFAIR to the air station
commanding officer. This solution shortly proved unsatisfactory, and
the next step was the commissioning of a COD squadron at the Naval Air
Station, Norfolk, with detachments as needed at other East Coast air
stations. Assuming that the last step taken has in fact resulted in
the most efficient solution to the problem of furnishing shore-to-ship
and ship- o-shore airlift capability, efficient costs of operating in
this fashion should be accepted as basic. However, had the costs of
the intermediate steps been evaluated in advance, it is to be hoped
that at least some of them would have been eliminated. To cite but one,
the administrative costs involved in transferring personnel (even though
no physical transfers were necessarily involved) from FASRON to air
station to COD squadron could have been used to press the advisability
of carefully considering the changes in several alternative ways before
any action was taken.
•}
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The usefulness of better cost information to the Fleet Com-
mander is so apparent as to obviate description. It may be wise,
however, to point out certain limitations which should be observed in
order that the dollar sign does not overshadow readiness. Assuming
that the fleet commander has good cost information for other types
of forces as well as aircraft squadrons, he and his planners should
be better able to price out not only "normal 1 ' fleet operations but
also the additional costs of flexing Uncle Sam's muscles in support of
his decisions in international affairs.
•'Normal" fleet operations are considered to be those which in-
volve training - to produce Increased readiness - and the logistic
functions of supporting this training. (It should not be assumed that
training and logistic support are mutually exclusive, however, for the
logistic forces must also be trained in their tasks in support of readi-
ness.) Task Group ALFA, one of he semi-permanent anti-submarine war-
fare training forces, is illustrative of "normal" operations. In
applying cost data to the use of the numerous units Involved in Task
Group ALFA, the fleet commander and his operational commander, Commander
Anti- Submarine Defense Forces, Atlantic ( COMASDEFORLANT ) , could price
out various alternative combinations of units. Within the total funds
available to the fleet commander, the costs of the various combinations
(probably presented as differing Operation Orders) must not be the
governing consideration. The position of preeminence must go to the
state of readiness achieved by each alternative Operation Order. On the
other hand, cost data may well enable the commander to select three
plans for successive execution whose collective readiness contribution
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or value exceeds a single more ambitious (and more costly) plan.
Unusual operations in support of the "cold war" have plagued
the fleet commanders in a way not always thought of by the casual ob-
server. It is almost intuitively known that fleet operating costs in-
crease in periods of crisis, and the "hotter" the crisis the less thought
is, and must be, given the cost of facing It. And yet specific opera-
ting costs - such as the cost of aircraft squadron readiness • are so
little known that the fleet commander (and his superiors in Washington)
are hard put to it to itemize the increases. This makes for embarrass-
ing times indeed in the halls of Congress when the Navy seeks to re-
cover extra costs in supplemental appropriations. Pleas of the fleet
commander to units physically involved in such crises as Suez and
Lebanon produce disappointingly little cost information for the
simple reason that operational commanders and their staffs are not train-
ed or accustomed to thinking in terms of dollar costs.
This same unfamiliar!! y with dollar costs In direct association
with operations is a never-ending problem at the highest level of com-
mand, both in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and in the
Navy Secretariat. When an economy-bent Congressman asks a direct ques-
tion at appropriation hearings on how much it costs to operate an air-
craft squadron at the Naval Air Station, Norfolk, as compared with the
cost of operating the same squadron at the air station in his home
district, it is not likely that his support will be gained by answering,
"We don't measure costs that way, Mr. Congressman." The frequent charges
leveled against the armed forces, not only by Congressmen but by many
others as well, that there is widespread waste and lack of cost-
.
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consciousness can scarcely be refuted by pious claims. Facts and fi-
gures based on just such simple building blocks as the costs of squad-
ron readiness could go a long way toward proving that the Navy has
finally recognized that "the job of economizing, which some would de-
legate to budgeteers and comptrollers, cannot be distinguished from the
whole task of making military decisions.*' 11




The "readiness" chapter of this paper was devoted to gaining an
insight into the factors that affect readiness. After viewing readi-
ness briefly from various vantage points in the chain of command, it
was decided that, although there is a different connotation at almost
every level or command, most connotations are but different facets of
the same gem. Said a slightly different way, readiness is a measure
of the ability of that portfion of the service being observed to carry
out its assigned mission.
Figure JA portrays the more important and obvious costs of readi-
ness. In Chapter II were outlined not only existing measures of costs
but also other possible ones. Indications of some uses of this cost
data were made, but at this juncture very little consideration was given
to he feasibility of making the measurements.
Chapter III showed that the overriding arguments against costing
to a squadron as the ultimate consumer arise from the decision to keep
the problem simple for the operating activities. Based upon this pre-
requisite and yet unwilling o ignore valuable benefits to be derived
from the effort, the return trip was made from the squadron level back
up the chain of command, pointing out along the way some of the use6 to






possible costing procedures are indeed not feasible when subjected to
the two-fold acid est of (1) what does it cost to do the job? and (2)
what is it worth? On the other hand, it is entirely inappropriate to
abandon the entire approach because it cannot be applied withou" ex-
ception.
It is concluded that cost da a would serve command purposes
well if it were collected and made available at various levels. It is
first necessary, however, to determine objectively just which elements
of cost should be collected at each command level. The distinction
must also be made between the elements o be collected, collated, and
reported by the shore activities and those which should become the
responsibility of he operating forces.
To consider the latter first, the decision to keep the account-
ing problem of he operating forces simple is regarded as an extremely
valid one. The unfortunate by-product of this decision, however, is
that the operating forces usually deny themselves the benefits to be
derived from even simple accounting. Thus cost data rela ed to the
BRAVO Allotment (fuel and NSA Spares) and to APA Spares can and should
be collected and used by operating forces as an aid to attain better
control by he commanding officers and commanders involved.
While collection of certain o her costs, particularly those in
the u ilities area, appear beyond the useful capabilities of even the
shore activities at present, the problem may begin to resolve itself in
he near future. Presently planned extension of he Navy Industrial
Fund to additional air stations, even though specifically limited to
industrial functions of the station, will undoub edly generate cost
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data that could be applied statistically to -he operating functions as
well.
A caution should be injected lest the accountants become over-
exuberant. The area of payroll costs provides a setting for this cau-
tion. The information here is almost readily available. The uses for
the information, however, are difficult for the lower levels of command
to comprehend inasmuch as there is very little control now exerted over
personnel distribution at he lower levels. The caution, then, is col-
lect the information for which there is a well-defined use and well
thought out need, and nothing more than that. Otherwise, the entire
program would and should collapse under the weight of the charge of
accounting for accounting's sake.
Finally, there is strong evidence to support the statement of
Hitch and McKean that "he job of economizing, which some would dele-
gate ?o budgeteers and comptrollers, cannot be distinguished from the
whole task of making military decisions."
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